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Abstract Live bird markets are common in certain regions
of the U.S. and in other regions of the world. We experi-
mentally tested the ability of a wild bird influenza A virus
to transmit from index animals to naı¨ve animals at varying
animal densities in stacked cages in a simulated live bird
market. Two and six mallards, five and twelve quail, and
six and nine pheasants were used in the low-density and
high-density stacks of cages, respectively. Transmission
did not occur in the high-density stack of cages likely due
to the short duration and relatively low levels of shedding,
a dominance of oral shedding, and the lack of transmission
to other mallards in the index cage. In the low-density stack
of cages, transmission occurred among all species tested,
but not among all birds present. Oral and cloacal shedding
was detected in waterfowl but only oral shedding was
identified in the gallinaceous birds tested. Overall, trans-
mission was patchy among the stacked cages, thereby
suggesting that chance was involved in the deposition of
shed virus in key locations (e.g., food or water bowls),
which facilitated transmission to some birds.
Introduction
Live bird markets (LBM) are common in certain areas of
the U.S. and abroad. For example, multiple LBMs are
present in the northeastern U.S. [4], various locations in
California, and other regions of the U.S. [24]; these
markets persist in part due to people’s preference for fresh
animals [5, 19]. These types of markets are also common in
other regions of the world, such as Asia and Africa [1, 21],
and often exist in these areas for the same reason listed
above [1, 19], as well as due to limited capacities for
refrigeration and frozen storage in some locations [6].
Avian influenza virus (AIV) can be a common problem
in LBMs [5, 19]. For example, a low pathogenic (LP) AIV
was detected in multiple LBMs in southern California
during 2005 [5], and a highly pathogenic (HP) AIV has
been detected in LBMs in Asia and Africa [1, 19]. In some
instances, the conditions found in these types of markets
are ideal for establishment and transmission of AIVs [19]
and LBMs have been suggested as the viral source of
previous outbreaks in commercial poultry in the north-
eastern U.S. [14]. Notably, LP H5 AIVs have been detected
in LBMs in the northeastern U.S. as recently as the summer
of 2016 [11].
A previous LBM study mimicking the southern Cali-
fornia LBM system and using an H6N2 AIV (isolated from
chickens) showed evidence of transmission among chick-
ens by multiple routes [23]. A second study, which eval-
uated the potential of chickens to transmit a chicken-
adapted virus to other avian species, showed evidence of
transmission to a high proportion of Japanese quail (Co-
turnix coturnix japonica; 80%), but only to a low propor-
tion of Pekin ducks (Anas platyrhynchos var. domestica;
5%) in an experimental LBM setting [22].
Introductions of AIVs continue to pose a threat to LBM
systems, poultry production and public health. The plethora
of market types found in LBMs globally suggests the need
for evaluations of LBM arrangements to further assess the
transmission of AIVs in these types of systems [22]. For
these reasons, the objective of this study was to assess the
transmission dynamics of AIV in a simulated multi-species
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LBM setting under two density treatments. To accomplish
this, a LP AIV strain isolated from a wild bird was used to
simulate the possibility of a wild bird introducing a virus
into an open air market and/or to the flocks of Poultry
production facilities for these markets.
Materials and methods
Study animals
A total of eight juvenile mallards (Anas platyrhynchos), 13
juvenile ring-necked pheasants (Phasianus colchicus), and
17 juvenile quail (Coturnix sp.) were utilized in this
experiment. All bird handling and sampling followed a
specific order from cage 1 to cage 9 (Figure 1). Daily
sampling consisted of an oral swab, a cloacal swab, a fecal
swab (from each cage, when present), and a water sample
(from each cage, when present). All swab samples were
stored in 1 mL of BA-1 viral transport media [15]. Animal
procedures were approved by the Animal Care and Use
Committee of the National Wildlife Research Center
(NWRC).
Because transmission of AIV in LBMs is likely density-
dependent, at least to some degree, stacks of bird cages
were equipped with two different densities of birds. The
low-density stack consisted of two juvenile mallards
housed in one double-wide cage (first [top] level), two
cages below the top level, one with two quail and one with
three quail (second level), then two cages of one pheasant
each (third level), and finally two cages of one pheasant
each (fourth [bottom] level). In addition, two cages of one
pheasant each were placed immediately adjacent to the first
level of this stack (Figure 1). The high-density stack con-
sisted of six juvenile mallards contained in one double-
wide cage (first [top] level), two cages of six quail each
(second level), two cages of two pheasants each (third
level), and two cages containing two pheasants in one and
one pheasant in the other (fourth [bottom] level). In addi-
tion, two cages of one pheasant each were placed imme-
diately adjacent to the fourth level of this stack (Figure 1).
Experimental infection
On day 0 post infection (DPI), one of the two mallards in
the low-density stack and two of the six mallards in the
high-density stack were randomly selected and orally
inoculated with approximately 106 EID50 of an avian-ori-
gin H6N2 AIV (A/wild bird/IL/183983-24/06[H6N2])
diluted to 1 mL in BA-1 diluent. These mallards were held
separately for approximately 1.5 hours prior to being
introduced into their respective stacks. These were the only
animals that were intentionally infected during this study.
An H6N2 AIV was chosen as inoculum because this sub-
type has been associated with LBM infections in the U.S.
during previous years [5], H6 viruses are prevalent in
LBMs in Asia [9], and H6 AIVs are commonly found in the
wild bird fauna in the U.S. [10]. The experimental design
allowed the assessment of virus transmission occurring
downward among cage rows (i.e., top to bottom) and
horizontally to adjacent cages. Cages remained stacked as
described until the morning of 3 DPI, to represent a short
duration (e.g., long weekend) LBM used in some live bird
markets, at which time they were unstacked. Cages were
then re-stacked in the same order during the afternoon of 4
DPI to assess transmission when infected birds are placed
in LBMs at later time-points during the infection.
In the low-density stack, oral swabs and cloacal swabs
were collected from each individual bird from 1-7 DPI and
on 9, 11, 14, and 16 DPI. In the high-density stack, oral and
cloacal swabs were collected from 1-7 DPI and on 9 DPI.
Water and fecal samples were opportunistically collected
each day the birds in a given cage were sampled. All swab
samples were stored in 1 mL of BA-1 viral transport media
and stored on wet ice during animal processing and at -
80C prior to analyses.
Due to the nominal and short duration of shedding from
the experimentally infected birds in the high-density stack,
along with the lack of transmission to the uninfected birds
observed via near real-time analyses, sampling was ter-
minated for this stack and all birds were euthanized at 10
DPI. The remaining birds from the low-density stack were
sampled for several more days and all birds were eutha-
nized on 15 or 16 DPI, at which time a blood sample was
taken.
Laboratory testing
Oral and cloacal swabs from birds and fecal swabs and
water samples from cages were tested for viral RNA by RT-
PCR following published protocols [17] as described pre-
viously [13]. Positive samples were defined as those
yielding two wells with positive amplifications (i.e., two
plate wells of the same sample) with a Cq value of B38.
Serological assessments were conducted with FlockCheck
Avian Influenza MultiS-Screen Antibody Test Kit (IDEXX
Laboratories, Inc., Westbrook, ME). This assay is intended
to be species independent, but has not been validated for all
of the species tested during the current study; therefore, in
these instances, seroconversions were inferred from the
differences in sample-to-negative ratios from pre- and post-
experiment serum samples.
2618 J. Jeffrey Root et al.
123
Results
High-density stack
Virus shedding was limited in the high-density stack. One
of the experimentally inoculated mallards from this stack
shed virus on a single day (1 DPI), while the second
experimentally inoculated mallard shed from 1-3 DPI
(Table 1). Of interest, aside from a single DPI, only oral
shedding was noted in both of these mallards. The paucity
of cloacal shedding observed in this stack is indicative of
minimal fecal shedding in these mallards. Not surprisingly,
these mallards failed to transmit the virus to any of their
cage mates or to other birds in the cages below them and
Fig. 1 Schematic of low-density (A) and high-density (B) stacks of
cages. Each stack was always sampled in order from cage 1 to cage 9,
to avoid mechanical transmission by animal workers. Birds shown in
red are animals that were deliberately infected. Animal drawings were
produced by Elizabeth Draves and Jeremy W. Ellis
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those located adjacent to their stack (Figure 2). Because of
this, the experimental LBM with the high-density stack was
terminated on 10 DPI at which time all animals were
euthanized. Although experimentally inoculated mallards
in the high-density stack had limited viral shedding, posi-
tive serological tests were noted in both of these mallards at
10 DPI, as both yielded sample-to-negative ratios clearly
under previously described thresholds for this species [16].
Low-density stack
The LBM experiment with the low-density stack produced
transmission to other bird species. Of interest, the single
mallard deliberately infected in this stack shed only from
the oral route from 1-3 DPI, but began to shed from the
cloacal route at 4 DPI (Table 1). No shedding was detected
from this mallard after 7 DPI. Its cage mate, which was not
deliberately infected, occasionally shed from the oral route
during early DPI and initiated cloacal shedding on 6 DPI.
This mallard continued to shed viral RNA through 14 DPI.
Thus, intra-cage transmission within this stack of cages
resulted in the detection of viral RNA for up to seven
additional days during the experimental period.
Two quail in cage 5 of the low-density stack shed virus
from the oral route at 6 DPI and continued to shed virus
until 9 DPI (Table 1; Figure 2). Of interest, both of these
quail, as well as one quail from cage 6, shed virus in
quantities of up to[104.0 EID50 equivalent/mL, which are
greater quantities than any mallard shed during the duration
of the low-density stack experiment (Table 1; Figure 2).
Table 1 Influenza A viral RNA shedding and serology of experimentally infected birds and birds placed in direct or indirect contact with
infected birds in a simulated live bird market. Only birds with evidence of infection (shedding or serology) are shown
Experimental setup All birds (both stacks) positive for viral RNA or antibodies Serology
Days post infection (mallards)
IDa Stackb Cage Species 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11 14 16 Multiple DPIc
1568 LD 9 Mallard Od ???
C —
??
—
?
—
—
???
—
???
?
??
?
?
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
P (-0.60)
1575 LD 9 Mallard O —
C —
?
—
?
—
—
—
??
—
?
???
?
?
?
??
?
—
—
?
—
—
P (-0.34)
756 LD 5 Quail O —
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
????
—
??
—
???
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
N (?0.06)
770 LD 5 Quail O —
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
???
—
????
—
????
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
S (-0.14)
762 LD 6 Quail O —
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
???
—
????
—
????
—
—
—
—
—
P (-0.23)
768 LD 6 Quail O —
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
???
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
N (?0.02)
A84 LD 2 Pheasant O —
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
—
??
—
???
—
—
—
P (-0.43)
456 LD 3 Pheasant O —
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
P (-0.34)
1561 HD 9 Mallard O ???
C —
??
—
??
????
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
nde nd nd P (-0.41)
1562 HD 9 Mallard O ?
C —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
nd nd nd P (-0.53)
a Animals with IDs shown in bold were experimentally infected
b LD = low-density stack; HD = high-density stack
c Animals from the high-density stack were bled on 10 DPI and animals from the low-density stack were bled on 15-16 DPI for serological
analyses. P = positive; N = negative; S = suspect positive. The number in parentheses is the difference in S/N ratios from pre- and post-
experiment serum samples
d O = oral sample; C = cloacal sample; ? = positive for viral RNA[ 100\ 102 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL; ?? =[ 10
2\ 103 log10 EID50
equivalent/mL; ??? =[ 103\ 104 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL; ???? =[ 10
4 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL; — = negative for viral RNA
e nd = not done
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Two of three quail in cage 6 initiated viral shedding on 7
DPI. One quail shed through 11 DPI and the other only
shed viral RNA for a single day. Thus, six days were
required to initiate transmission of this virus from the index
animal to interspecific bird species.
Evidence of transmission was limited to two of six
pheasants located in the low-density stack (Figure 2). One
pheasant from the fourth level of the stack showed evi-
dence of shedding and seroconversion while the other
from the third level only seroconverted. Oral shedding in
Fig. 2 Experimental outcome of a low-density (A) and high-density
(B) simulated live bird market experimental transmission study.
Shapes filled with red represent animals that shed viral RNA and
seroconverted. Shapes filled with orange represent animals that shed
viral RNA but did not seroconvert during the study period. Shapes
filled with yellow represent animals that seroconverted but did not
shed detectable viral RNA. Animal drawings were produced by
Elizabeth Draves and Jeremy W. Ellis
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the single pheasant initiated on 9 DPI and continued
through 14 DPI (Table 1). Of interest, the pheasant that
shed and seroconverted was located at the bottom of the
low-density stack, which was the farthest distance possi-
ble within this stack from the index mallard. This sug-
gests, along with the observation of no transmission
occurring to pheasants located adjacent to index mallards
(cages 7 and 8; Figure 1 and 2), that transmission to this
pheasant was likely associated with fecal shedding or
spilled water from mallards. Alternatively, considering
that this pheasant did not produce viral shedding until
after the shedding by quail located above it (cages 2 and
6; Figure 2; Table 1) was initiated, quail may have indi-
rectly transmitted the virus to the pheasant, which may
have been facilitated by the virus being passaged through
a gallinaceous bird. If this were the case, transmission
from quail to pheasants likely occurred through virus-
laden oral secretions from quail. No positive cloacal
swabs were ever detected from quail or pheasants
(Table 1), but positive environmental samples associated
with both water and fecal samples (the feces sampled in a
given cage were not necessarily representative of the
species occupying that cage) were commonly found in
cages housing both species (Table 2).
Discussion
The lack of observed transmission in the high-density stack
was likely because the experimental infection of two
mallards in this stack only appeared to produce a short
duration infection in a single mallard, although a second
mallard exhibited nominal viral RNA on a single DPI
(Table 1). Therefore, this study clearly showed individual
heterogeneity in shedding responses within hosts, similar to
what has been observed previously in other species [8]. In
addition, the infected mallard in the high-density stack only
shed virus for a short duration and aside from a single day,
only by the oral route. Thus, the inoculated mallards did
not shed sufficient virus to infect their cage mates or the
birds in adjacent or lower cages (Figure 2). Viral trans-
mission in the high-density stack may have had a different
outcome if shedding by other routes was more prevalent, as
AIV shed via the fecal route by mallards can be rapidly
transmitted among conspecifics when a shared water
source, sufficient in size for fecal-oral transmission, is
present [18]. Only small water sources were available in
these pens, which precluded their use for bathing and
swimming. Thus, a larger water source, although likely
unrealistic in most LBM settings, may have facilitated
more transmission. For example, relatively high quantities
of virus have been reported in artificial waterbodies used
by experimentally infected mallards [2].
The lack of transmission in the high-density stack was
somewhat surprising, but is consistent with some other
studies. For example, limited contact transmission was
noted for experimentally infected (H7N9 A/Anhui/1/2013)
Pekin ducks co-housed with naı¨ve ducks [7]. We hypoth-
esize that the lack of contact transmission among co-
housed ducks is due to the lack of large shared water
resources conducive of oral-fecal transmission. For exam-
ple, others have shown successful transmission among
mallards in contact with a water source previously con-
taminated by experimentally infected mallards [18] and
water-associated transmission has also been postulated for
mammals [12]. Overall, the index mallards in the high-
density stack appear to have shed virus for insufficient time
and in insufficient quantities to elicit transmission within
this stacked cage setting.
A previous simulated LBM study suggested that aerosol
transmission was an important route in their study [23]. In
the current study, in which a wild bird virus was used and
chickens were absent from the experimental LBM setting,
no clear evidence of aerosol transmission was observed.
Considering that LP AIV is primarily a gastrointestinal
disease of ducks, we did not expect to observe aerosol
transmission in the index animals. Additionally, this is
supported by several pieces of evidence. First, aside from a
single co-caged mallard in cage 9 (Figure 2), evidence of
transmission in the low-density stack was not observed
until 6 DPI, one day after positive fecal and water envi-
ronmental samples were detected in most other cages on 5
DPI (Tables 1 and 2). Second, environmental virus was not
detected until 4 DPI in the low-density stack, the same day
that cloacal shedding was first detected in this stack
(Table 2). Third, if aerosols were a major source of
transmission in the current experimental LBM, the finding
of non-infected animals in cages above those animals that
became infected during the study would appear unlikely
(Figure 2). Notably, a previous study reported transmission
to quail in stacked cages adjacent to (separated by one foot)
cages housing index chickens infected with a poultry
adapted virus, thereby suggesting that aerosol transmission
was apparent for at least some of these birds [22]. Thus,
aerosol transmission, as reported by others [22, 23], may be
a more common mode of transmission of poultry-adapted
H6N2 viruses in chickens as compared to the wild bird
virus and avian species that we used.
Transmission to the single pheasant in level four (cage
2; Figures 1 and 2) of the low-density stack is likely
attributed to one or more fecal samples or spilled water that
passed through the other levels and landed in a location of
2622 J. Jeffrey Root et al.
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the pheasant’s cage, such as its food or water dish, that
facilitated transmission. Thus, chance, at least to some
degree, is likely involved in transmission within LBMs,
especially in instances when viruses are not prone to be
transmitted by the aerosol route. An additional pheasant
located in cage 3 showed no evidence of shedding viral
RNA but did show evidence of seroconversion (Table 1;
Figure 2). This suggests that this bird was exposed to small
quantities of virus, likely sufficient to initiate a serological
response, but insufficient to produce viral replication.
Alternatively, this bird may have shed virus on a day that
we did not sample or may have shed an amount of virus
that was under the threshold of detection of our RT-PCR
assay. A similar observation, in which a high proportion of
Pekin ducks in an experimental LBM yielded positive
hemagglutinin inhibition tests, but only one duck was
positive by RT-PCR, has been reported prevsiously [22].
Except for the index animals, quail exhibited the
greatest proportion of animals infected, with 80% showing
evidence of shedding on at least one DPI in the low-density
stack (Table 1). Nonetheless, two quail failed to serocon-
vert by the termination of this experiment. A similar
observation has been described previously in chickens [23].
One potential explanation for the one quail that only shed
on 7 DPI is that the apparent shedding observed in this
animal was simply associated with the ingestion of virus-
laden water [20], as viral RNA was detected on several DPI
in the water bowls of both quail cages (Table 2). However,
this explanation appears unlikely for the second quail that
failed to seroconvert, as this bird shed during 6-9 DPI, and
shed in greater quantities than its cage-mate, which was the
only other quail shedding on 6 DPI (Table 1). The obser-
vation that quail represent a high proportion of all infected
birds in simulated LBMs has been reported previously for
emergent H7N9 IAV [3]. Given the high proportion of
quail that shed virus during the current study and in other
studies, quail may be important species for transmission in
experimental LBMs; consequently, quail warrant addi-
tional scrutiny in their roles in the transmission of AIVs in
LBM settings [3, 22].
The current study demonstrated that a wild bird virus
can be transmitted to multiple avian species commonly
found in LBM settings. Consistent with a pervious study
[23], inter-cage transmission took several days to occur
among stacked cages, likely associated with the index
animal(s) shedding virus in insufficient quantities to initiate
transmission during early DPI. Thus, this suggests that
LBMs with complete and frequent turnovers of animals
may be at reduced risk for transmission. Additional studies
are needed to assess management practices for the
Table 2 Influenza A viral RNA
detections from environmental
samples in a simulated live bird
market. Only cages from the
low-density stack are shown.
Fecal samples are not
necessarily representative of the
animal or species in a given
cage
Experimental setup Days post infection (mallard)
Stacka Cage Species 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11 14 16
LD 1 Pheasant Fa—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
—
???
—
ndb
?
nd
—
??
?
—
?
—
LD 2 Pheasant F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
—
???
?
—
?
??
?
—
??
?
—
?
—
LD 3 Pheasant F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
??
?
??
—
?
—
??
—
?
??
—
—
—
LD 4 Pheasant F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
??
?
?
??
—
??
??
???
—
—
??
—
LD 5 Quail F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
??
?
—
??
???
??
—
???
—
—
?
—
LD 6 Quail F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
??
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
nd
?
—
—
—
LD 7 Pheasant F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
?
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
LD 8 Pheasant F—
W—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
nd
—
nd
—
—
LD 9 Mallard F—
W nd
—
—
—
—
?
??
????
???
???
???
??
nd
??
???
???
nd
—
nd
?
nd
a F = fecal sample; W = water sample; ? = positive for viral RNA[100\102 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL;
?? =[102\103 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL; ??? =[10
3\104 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL; ???? =
[ 104 log10 EID50 equivalent/mL; — = negative for viral RNA
b nd = not done (e.g., no sample available)
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positioning of animals in these types of settings to limit
viral transmission.
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